

Opinion

Dialectics of structure and governance

By Edwin Madunagu

IN a letter to the editor of this newspaper, published in the paper's edition of Sunday, July 31, 2011, Basil Ogbanufe called for the abolition of states in Nigeria's political structure. He then made the following direct suggestion: "instead of the present three-tier system, let us operate a two-tier system: federal and local governments. The Federal House of Representatives will have to increase to accommodate one member per local government who will be a member of his or her local government House of Assembly. The Senate will have to reduce to two senators per state".

We can immediately see one contradiction in Ogbanufe's proposal: on the one hand he called for the abolition of states; and, on the other hand, he suggested the retention of representation in the Senate on the basis of states. But this contradiction - and several others - notwithstanding, I decided to start the present discussion with Ogbanufe's proposal because it is simple, passionate, and, above all, as we shall see below, unlike so many other contributions to this national debate, it links governance to geopolitical structure and makes reference to the anticipated role of the "people" - by which he meant the "common people" or the "masses".

Why does Ogbanufe want the states abolished? Here he goes: "The real corruption (problem of Nigeria) is being perpetrated by state governors and their Houses of Assembly. The cost of running the state governments is enormously high, but the annoying part is that the governors cannot be held accountable; they parade themselves as demi-gods". Beyond this "righteous indignation", which many people honestly share, Ogbanufe offered the following perspective on the proposed two-tier structure: "The local government chairman, being the chief executive of the local government, is nearer to the people, and the people see him or her everyday. If there is any foul play by the chairman, or other elected representatives, the people will deal with them directly as there will be no state governor or

god-father to shield them. The people will be aware of the life style of their elected representatives as they live in their midst. They will, also, be aware of revenues accruing to them".

Ogbanufe is also of the opinion that his proposed two-tier political structure will enhance "accountability", a subject that is taken very seriously by discussants in this national debate. But he does not say how this "accountability" will be instituted or maintained. He only suggests how any offender would be dealt with by the people: direct action. In ending his proposal, Ogbanufe shows that, like many contributors to this debate, he is not free from the *problematic of the present dispensation*. He says: "The two-tier system will reduce the volume of rancour during party primaries and the cost of organizing elections". Finally, the hope: "It will enhance, strengthen and develop our democracy", and make security "very effective". But he does not say exactly how.

What do I mean by the *problematic of Nigeria's present dispensation*? Let me explain what I mean this way: In spite of the serious disagreements within and between the factions, factions and strata of Nigeria's ruling classes and power blocs on allocation of offices and resources, there are, between them, basic agreements on the "fundamentals" of the existing economic system and vision of a democratic order. It is this two-sided regime (economy and "politics") that I call *dispensation*. Explicitly, the two sides of the dispensation are a near-fully-privatised and commercialized, capitalist economy (often misnamed "market economy") that progressively deepens and spreads mass poverty; and competition between large political parties, laying claim to forms of "internal democracy", including "primaries". These two faces of *neoliberal capitalism or capitalist neoliberalism* are inseparable.

Because neoliberal capitalism and neoliberal democracy are inseparable, one has to be careful when picking any of their sub-elements, such as the concept of party primaries, privatisation, "free market", or "smaller government" in articulating a programme of radical social transformation. Why? Because

however "democratic" or "reasonable" any element of this economic and political dispensation may appear, it is infected with what Samir Amin has called the "liberal virus". Any radical social transformation must therefore be insulated from this virus because it ultimately destroys whatever it infects. But, unfortunately, most of the proposals I have so far read or heard - from the "right", through the "middle", to the "left" ideological spectrum - are heavily infected by the neoliberal capitalist virus.

As I said earlier, I am focusing on Ogbanufe's short contribution to this national debate - in spite of its contradictions - because it is simple, passionate, links structure to governance, (and not governance for the "leaders" and "rulers" or for its own sake) and, above all, it assigns a particular role - other than voting periodically - to the "common people". Nigeria's legislators have a name for this role: "oversight" function. But they assign the function to themselves, citing the Constitution. Ogbanufe assigns "oversight" functions, including "dealing with thieving rulers, at least at the local level, to the "common people".

Before taking leave of Basil Ogbanufe, I may bring the following point to his notice - in case he is not aware: What he is, in practice, asking for is a *unitary system of government for Nigeria*. The reason is simple: With the current level and structure of Nigeria's socioeconomic development and the dynamics of this development, the elimination of all intermediate structures between the local and the federal means the allocation, to the latter, of virtually all functions above that of maintaining and reproducing individual and community life at the most basic level. The basic functions of local government authorities would include primary and adult "remedial" education, primary healthcare and provision of polyclinics and at least one general hospital per local government area; sanitation; markets; building and maintaining "feeder" roads; security of personal and community life; small-scale or "cottage" industries, etc.

Beyond the functions listed above, all other socioeconomic structures, including big in-

dustries and infrastructures, must go to the federal government. And this federal government will, in addition, oversee and coordinate the activities of the local governments which, by the last count, are 774. I am not to be construed as ruling out Ogbanufe's two-tier political structure. Neither theoretically, nor ideologically, nor even sentimentally, can I rule it out. I am only pointing out the immediate implications of his proposal - for him to know what it involves not only in terms of constitutional revision, but in term of direct popular action. An elder warned me long ago that a cat that wants to catch a fish must be ready to wet its feet; and that a cat will be as stupid as "barking at the moon" to think that it can remain on dry land and hope to take possession of a living fish.

Ogbanufe's two-tier structure, to be realized and sustained, unmodified, would require an earth-shaking popular revolution: a revolution that can defend itself with the forces it can generate. If this is what Ogbanufe has in mind, he did not say so in his contribution. But as "repulsive" as this two-tier structure might sound, it did not lack supporters in the past, and does not lack them now.

For the second leg of this introductory segment of our discussion, I would like to go back 45 years into Nigeria's post-independence history. Yakubu Gowon, then a lieutenant - colonel in the Nigerian Army, became Nigeria's second military Head of State at the end of July 1966, succeeding J. I. U. Aguiyi-Ironsi, a major-general, who had assumed office as first Head of State in mid-January, 1966. On September 12, 1966, Gowon opened a Constitutional Conference in Lagos. The framework that Yakubu gave to the conference can be summarised as follows: Two extreme options - unitarism and disintegration should be ruled out *ab initio*. Consideration should then be limited to three viable options, namely: "a federal system with a weak centre; a federal system with a strong centre; and an entirely new arrangement which will be peculiar to Nigeria and which has not yet found its way into any political dictionary." I shall have cause to refer to Gowon's 45-year-old proposal as we proceed.

• To be continued next Thursday.

Opinion

Dialectics of structure and governance (2)

By Edwin Madunagu

LET me begin this second segment of our discussion with two explanatory notes. First, in the context of this discussion, and following a modern college dictionary, I shall define *structure* as the "organisation of parts as dominated by the general character of the whole"; or the "aggregate of an entity in their relationships to each other". Secondly, I shall define *dialectics*, also in the context of our discussion, as the "way in which aspects of a situation affect each other". I am offering these simple definitions so as to be "on the same page" with the reader, as an American friend would say.

My first proposition, following these explanations, is that when we speak of Nigeria's political structure, economic structure, social structure, geopolitical structure or governance structure, we are merely looking at the organization or entity, called Nigeria, through a particular prism, a prism that attempts to isolate a particular aspect and pull it out for closer look, deeper analysis and, hence, deeper understanding of not just the particular aspect but the organization of a whole. I say "attempt" because this "isolating" and "pulling out" can only be approximate, given the intimate and inseparable connections, in real life, between the various parts and aspects of the structured organization, in this case, Nigeria.

The corollary to this proposition is that not only are the various parts and aspects of Nigeria (as a structured organization) inseparable, continuously impacting on each other, they also - individually and collectively - impact on governance (or quality of governance), and conversely. It is surely not an accident that the social groups that are dominant in the economy are also the ones that are dominant in the political sphere. It is not an accident or mere coincidence that struggles seen in Nigerian politics are reproduced in, and are reproduced by, struggles in the economy where they may be less visible or less dramatic.

Finally, it does not require a genius to discover

that the positions being taken by the various power blocs and social forces on the debates on single-term presidency, rotational presidency, zonal or regional restructuring, decentralization of power and functions, true and fiscal federalism, for instance, cannot be explained entirely by references to such attributes like "political sophistication", "liberal spirit", "feudal reaction" or "nostalgia for the past". We must also look closely not only at the position each group occupies in the country's power structure but also at the struggles going on between them in the sphere of primitive capitalist accumulation.

Last Thursday, in the first part of this discussion, I presented two views on the question of structure. The first, by Basil Ogbanufe, called for the abolition of the states, leaving Nigeria with only two tiers of government: local and federal governments. The implication of this, of which the gentleman was probably unaware, was the institution of a unitary form of government in Nigeria. The second opinion, offered almost 45 years ago, in September 1966, was that of war-time Head of State, General Yakubu Gowon (then a lieutenant-colonel in the Nigerian Army). Gowon ruled out two extreme options: unitarism and its polar opposite: disintegration; and suggested federalism with a strong centre; or federalism with a weak centre (whose extreme is confederalism); or an "entirely new arrangement which will be peculiar to Nigeria and which has not yet found its way into any political dictionary".

The reader may be wondering why this sudden "attraction" for a 45-year old suggestion which was like "medicine after death" since nothing at that point could preserve the "unity" of the country. I am attracted by the precise formulation of Gowon's 1966 proposal: *Rule out disintegration; rule out unitarism; consider federalism with a strong centre; consider federalism with a weak centre; and, if neither is acceptable, then construct an entirely new system unique to Nigeria.* This formulation rules out extremes but otherwise leaves room for all practical possibilities. History has taught us that it is futile presenting extremes for discus-

sion. You act them. And this was exactly what happened in Nigeria on May 30, 1967.

In April 1987, I proposed a five-tier governmental structure: community; local government area; state; region or zone; and national or federal. I made this proposal in my own report of the Political Bureau work. The media called it a "minority report", but I was not bothered. In any case, the *African Guardian* magazine published it in nine parts between July 30, 1987 and September 24, 1987. The five-tier structure was not proposed arbitrarily. It was proposed in the context of socialism or popular democracy for which the overwhelming majority of the Nigerian people opted during the 12 month-long national debate in 1986. The new social order would be characterized by popular mobilization for grassroots development and self-activity of the "common people". The "government" would necessarily be "large", but its "cost" would be far far smaller than what it is now. My proposal on political structure was linked to the socioeconomic system and the roles of the "common people".

Ten years after the Political Bureau report, in October 1997, I delivered a public lecture in Calabar where I presented some sections of the report. They were revised, but only minimally. Three paragraphs of that lecture are relevant here, and I reproduce extracts from them. The first extract says: "The functions of the local government (in the five-tier structure) should be enlarged and those most directly and immediately affecting the lives of the people should be delegated to the community. The bureaucracy of the community should be minimal, and the leadership should be able to mobilize and employ (voluntary) communal labour in certain cases. Revenue allocation should be between the federal government, the states, the local government, and the community".

It can be seen that I allocated nothing to the regions or zones because I was not sure at that time, nor am I sure now, that "governments" should be constituted at that level. The surer relevance of the zones or regions will appear later below. I am, however, aware that one of

Nigeria's power blocs is bitterly opposed to the constitution of the zones into a tier of government standing between the states and the federal government. To this power bloc, there are only two real zones in Nigeria: the North and the South. I shall return to this view later in this discussion; but for now I would say that the power-bloc "anti-zone" position, together with the context in which it is taken, is as far from my position as the sun is from the earth.

As for the Presidency, I recommended as follows: "There should be an eight-member *Collective Presidency* at the federal level. Each member of the Presidency will represent a zone, and there are to be eight zones in the country. A zone will be constituted by a number of states. The Chair and the Vice-Chair of the Presidency or the Presidential Council should be rotational, six months per session. Every member of the Collective Presidency will be a member of the Cabinet responsible for a strategic ministry or government department". I concluded by proposing that the "new structure should be creatively applied to all other levels of government, namely: state, local government and community", adding, however, that "for this popular-democratic transformation to go beyond a dream, a struggle must be engaged."

These proposals were made in 1987 and re-endorsed with minimal editorial revisions in 1997. Even now, it will be idle for me to go beyond these broad outlines unless and until changes begin to take place in other parts of the "Nigerian structure", including, in particular, in the character of popular-democratic intervention in Nigerian politics: from being "pressure groups" to becoming a significant voice, seriously posing the question of people-serving governance as a practical and immediate political possibility. It can, indeed, be frustrating to continue to write "memoranda" for Nigeria's ruling classes and power blocs whose interests run counter to the need to halt and begin to reverse this deepening pauperization and disempowerment of the Nigerian people.

• To be continued next Thursday.

Opinion

Dialectics of structure and governance (3)

By Edwin Madunagu

ACCORDING to a 2005 article attributed to Dr. Alex Ekwueme, Nigeria's Vice-President during the Second Republic (October 1, 1979 - December 30, 1983), the 1995 Nigerian Constitution, which was prepared under the military rulership of General Sani Abacha, provided for one-term rotational presidency. Please, refer to the back page of *This Day* newspaper (Wednesday, August 3, 2011) where the article was reproduced. The one-term presidency was to last five years, and the rotation was to take place between the present six geopolitical zones. The Constitution would have come into effect on October 1, 1998, but for the sudden death, in early June 1998, of General Sani Abacha who, as Head of State, would have made the proclamation.

The 1995 Constitution had other interesting provisions. For instance, for each state, the office of state governor was to rotate between the three senatorial zones of the state. The office of chair of the local government was also to rotate between entities that were to be decided by the state authorities. The entire political arrangement was to last 30 years from the date of the promulgation of the Constitution. By the end of this 30-year transition period all the six geopolitical zones would have tasted the presidency once; and every senatorial zone of every state would have supplied the state governor twice.

That was not all in this effort at "power sharing": There were to be six principal political officers at the federal level, namely, President, Vice-President, Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives. At every point during this 30-year period, each of the six geopolitical zones would occupy one of the six principal offices. The Constitution was drafted by a National Constitutional Conference, three-quarters of whose almost 400 members were elected (on non-party basis) and one-quarter nominated by the military regime to represent "special interests".

The Secretariat of the Conference was not set up by the Conference or its leadership.

The powerful Secretariat was set up by the military regime and imposed on the Conference. As would be expected, the Secretariat, which in turn had a powerful leadership, was responsible not to the Conference, but to the military government that set it up. The National Constitutional Conference sat for 12 months, from June 1994 to June 1995, and produced a draft Constitution or draft Constitutions, since it was public knowledge at the time that rival drafts emanated from the Conference: at least one from the Conference proper and another from the powerful Secretariat. It was also known that the military government "reached out" at critical moments, to members of the Conference through the Secretariat members.

The thinking of the authors of the draft Constitution, or the version of the draft Constitution which General Sani Abacha, had he lived, would have signed into law on October 1, 1998, was that by the end of the 30-year transition period Nigeria would have become a united country - indeed, a united nation. All feelings of marginalization would have died since every section of the country would have tasted power several times at various levels. For instance, my geopolitical zone would have produced the President, the Vice-President, the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Senate President, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Beyond that, at the end of the 30-year transition period, my senatorial district would have produced the Governor (two times), the Deputy Governor (two times) and the Speaker of the House of Assembly (two times). Finally, in the scenario under consideration, my small community would have produced the Chair of our local government at least once.

Please, do not read any cynicism into what I have said so far, particularly in the preceding paragraph. For, I was convinced, after reading the article attributed to Dr. Ekwueme, who was an elected member of the (1994-1995) Constitutional Conference and a leading political and moral force in that gathering, that Nigeria's ruling blocs, as represented in the Conference and as inspired from the outside, were serious about

"power-sharing" as formula for peace and for nation building. The constitution drafters obviously believed that since competitions and struggles between the ruling blocs had been the main cause of the "instability" their task was to evolve a formula for "equitable distribution" and "movement" of political power, and what this power could guarantee. But our "leaders" were mistaken on at least two counts.

In the first place, as late Professor Claude Ake would say, Nigerian rulers don't know how to be equal; they don't know how to stand side by side. In any relationship between any two of them, one person must be on top of the other; one person must oppress the other. The capitalist logic and ethics that operate in "business" also operate, with equal force, in the sphere of politics. No wonder our rulers are such poor "democrats". The still-born Constitution stipulated that the President should hold "regular meetings" with the principal officers. So, what is the difference between this arrangement and the Rotational Collective Presidency which I suggested in the second part of this discussion?

The difference is that whatever the level of "regular meetings" or "consultations" between the President and these other principal officers, they can never be equal; they cannot constitute a collective of equal members as suggested in the Collective Presidency proposal. For Nigerian rulers, every executive authority, to be properly constituted, must have chief executive, deputy chief executive, assistant deputy chief executive, and so on, in strict hierarchical order. But, more crucially, these differences in designation must be reflections of real differences in powers, functions and emoluments. In particular, the differences in title must be statements of the powers which some members have on other members within the authority. These powers include, in particular, the powers to dismiss colleagues or render them functionally redundant as President Obasanjo did to Vice President Atiku between 2003 and 2007.

Nigeria's power blocs don't really like the idea of rotation of leadership within a collective. You may succeed, after much effort,

in persuading them to accept the idea of collectivity; but they are not likely to shift from their stand that the leadership in that collective must either be permanent or be by "merit" where "merit", as we all know, means the power of money. The second reason the elaborate political design of the 1995 Constitution would not have worked is simple: the designers' only concern was with sharing and rotating offices between factions and fractions of the ruling classes and the various groups of claimants. There was nothing for the masses, the common people. There was no mention of benefits to the masses (material or otherwise) or the roles they would play - other than voting periodically - in the prescribed political dispensation. For this reason, popular opposition and struggles would have continued and the Constitution would have collapsed ultimately.

All these comments notwithstanding, it cannot be said that the current 1999 Constitution, even as amended, is superior, in any way, to the 1995 Constitution. Furthermore, I do not think that President Goodluck Jonathan's Constitutional proposal for a one-term presidency, in all the versions in which it had appeared in the media, is in any way superior to the one-term rotational presidency proposal in the 1995 document. It follows that what I have said about that document applies, at least with equal force, to President Jonathan's 2011 proposal. *I shall return to this.*

Dr. Anthony Akinola, a regular informed contributor to Opinion pages of *The Guardian* deserves commendation for the uncommon seriousness, passion, intellect and - above all - faith he had shown in arguing the case for rotational and single-term presidency for many years. One of his latest contributions is *The single term proposal* (*The Guardian*, August 1, 2011). In that article, Akinola cautiously supported President Jonathan's one-term presidency proposal and asked Nigerians to give it a thought. But I know that Akinola is aware that the details of his proposal together with the socio-economic and ethical context in which they could work, are very distant from Jonathan's offer. *I shall also return to this.*
To be concluded next Thursday.

Opinion

Dialectics of structure and governance (4)

By Edwin Madunagu

THIS concluding segment was originally reserved for appreciating recent proposals from some Nigerians who have shown more than average interest in the subject under discussion, specifically from the standpoint of constitutional liberal democracy, true and fiscal federalism and ethnic self-determination.

Going through the contributions that I have before me I pick out three authors for the breadth, clarity and representativeness of their views. The personages are Chief Anthony Enahoro, acting personally and through the Movement for National Reformation (MNR) and Pro-National Conference Organisation (PRONACO); Professor Segun Gbadegesin, a columnist with *The Nation* newspaper who made a five-part contribution (*A matter of structure*) in his Friday column between May 27 and June 24, 2011; and Dr. Anthony Akinola with whom I ended last Thursday's segment. As far as I can see, Enahoro's advocacy and Gbadegesin's argument emanated from the same liberal and federalist mind and political (as different from partisan) perspectives. So, while I focus on Enahoro's views, I would strongly recommend Gbadegesin's five-part essay for serious study. *I shall, in the near future, return to Gbadegesin's and Akinola's specific ideas, but in the context of a related discussion.*

I wrote a three-part article on the Sovereign National Conference (SNC) in this column about 19 years ago. I can recall them: *For a Sovereign National Conference (SNC) (June 25, 1992); SNC and flashpoints of discontent*, (July 2, 1992); and *Organising the SNC* (July 9, 1992). In that series I argued, I would say very strongly and passionately, for the convening of SNC which I regarded then (19 years ago) and still regard, as "historically inevitable" if Nigeria is to be saved as a united country. I also proposed five broad issues for discussion at that conference. These were the national question; fundamental human rights; philosophy of government; state and religion; and economic system and property ownership. The only item I would add today is *citizenship*. As I said then, which I am repeating now, *the way the SNC is brought into*

being together with the specific form it takes, depends on the correlation and balance of forces at that point in time.

I met with Chief Anthony Enahoro for the first time during the second half of 1992. The meeting took place in Lagos, in his hotel room, and it was at the invitation of the eminent nationalist and elder statesman. It is necessary to give the background and motive force of this meeting - which was to be the beginning of a series of one-on-one meetings in Lagos and Benin, and spreading over several years.

In the second part of my series on SNC, while arguing the case for restructuring, I had written: "It is on record that in 1913, a year before the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria, C. L. Temple, who was then the Lieutenant-Governor of Northern Nigeria and Acting Governor of Nigeria, proposed the division of the colonial territory into seven regions, namely: Lagos Region, Western Region, Central Region, Eastern Region, Benue Region, North-western Region, and Chad Region". But this was rejected by Lord Lugard on the ground that it was necessary to preserve the "classic cleavage between the north and the south" and a status-quo which he claimed "was sanctioned by cultural history". I denounced Lord Lugard's reasoning as opportunistic and laying the foundations of some of the problems that have not yet been resolved, almost a century after the creation of the country.

The emissary who brought me Chief Enahoro's invitation was a comrade of mine. He told me that the elderly nationalist was "impressed" by some ideas in my three-part article on the SNC, particularly the "agenda" proposed for the conference and my mention of regional restructuring and Lord Lugard's "errors". I suspected that my comrade had discussed my article with Chief Enahoro, but I did not tell him so. In the first meeting, and in subsequent ones, Enahoro did most of the talking. These "talks" can be resolved into three parts: explaining his ideas and proposals to me; arguing that my own ideas were similar to, or at least not irreconcilable with, his; and answering my specific question. I knew it was a "golden" opportunity to be with

Enahoro one-on-one, and I tried to extract as much as possible from him.

In 1992, Chief Anthony Enahoro's proposal was that Nigeria should be restructured into eight federations. The country would then become a *federation of eight federations*. The eight constituent federations are to be known as *regions*. Each of these regions would be constituted by ethnic nationalities and constellations of ethnic nationalities. Chief Enahoro showed me maps, documents and papers on which he was still working, but insisted that the criteria adopted by him and the Movement for National Reformation (MNR) led him to conclude that there were at most 70 ethnic nationalities and constellations of ethnic nationalities in Nigeria. These criteria, he tried to demonstrate to me, were both scientific and historical. He showed me the list of the ethnic nationalities and where each was located on the map of Nigeria and the region where it belonged. I also saw the proposed political map of Nigeria based on the eight-region structure.

Chief Enahoro gave two reasons why he believed that the restructuring of Nigeria was imperative. The first reason, according to him, was "to resolve the *nationalities question* in Nigeria". The second was the need "to restore genuine federalism as envisaged by the country's founding fathers, by the creation of units large enough to perform the functions originally reserved for the regions but which have been progressively eroded by the Federal Government, by reason, among other causes, of the diminutiveness and impecuniousness of the present states". The eight regions or regional federations proposed by Chief Enahoro and the Movement for National Reformation (MNR) in 1992 were: *Western Federation; Southcentral federation; Eastcentral federation; Southeastern federation; Central Federation; Northeastern Federation; Northern Federation; and Westcentral Federation*.

The eight-region structure which I prepared several years earlier agreed with that of Chief Enahoro and MNR. But at the time I met with the elderstatesman in 1992, I had not attempted to set down the structure as a map, nor had I attempted to fit the states then existing, or Nige-

ria's ethnic nationalities, into the regions as Enahoro and MNR had done. However, our two structures followed what I called the *principle of triple balancing*: balance between the North and the South (four regions each); balance between the "majority" and the "minority" ethnic nationalities (four regions each); and balance between the East and the West (two regions each).

My view then was that Enahoro's boldness in going into details, though commendable, also carried the danger of instant rejection by "leaders" of ethnic nationalities which were treated either as non-existent or as sub-nationalities. Even at that time, I was as uncomfortable, as I am now, with ethnic-based restructuring, and I told him so. (See my article, *The impossibility of ethnic separation*, November 4, 1999).

Ten years later, in 2002, Chief Enahoro and the MNR came out with a radically revised structure. The nationalist now proposed the restructuring of Nigeria into 18 federating regions. The revised proposal preserved the principle of *triple balancing*. Twelve of the regions (or federations) were "mono-nationalities"; and six were "multi-nationalities". In both the 1992 and 2002 proposals, the country was to return to the parliamentary system; and will be bound by a number of fundamental principles, including those of constitutional secular democracy, the rule of law true and fiscal federalism, human rights, social welfare and egalitarianism, full employment, governmental transparency and accountability, and modernization.

This was an "attractive" and commendable proposal, and I told Chief Enahoro so. But my reservation remained the same, namely: *the impossibility of ethnic separation in Nigeria - by dialogue or by war*. I believe, however, that any serious geopolitical restructuring or constitutional review must be informed by a number of factors, including, in particular, the ethnic nationality question. In 2006, the Pro-National Conference (PRONACO) published a draft Constitution it had worked out for Nigeria. In it I read Chief Enahoro again. And my commendation and reservation remained.

• *Concluded.*